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Abstract 
Background. Consumers are increasingly using online pharmacies, but these sites may not 
provide an adequate level of security with the consumers‘ personal data. There is a gap in this 
research addressing the problems of security vulnerabilities in this industry.  
Objectives. The objective is to identify the level of web application security vulnerabilities in 
online pharmacies and the common types of flaws, thus expanding on prior studies. 
Technical, managerial and legal recommendations on how to mitigate security issues are 
presented. 
Method. The proposed four-step method first consists of choosing an online testing tool. The 
next steps involve choosing a list of 60 online pharmacy sites to test, and then running the 
software analysis to compile a list of flaws. Finally, an in-depth analysis is performed on the 
types of web application vulnerabilities. 
Results. The majority of sites had serious vulnerabilities, with the majority of flaws being 
cross-site scripting or old versions of software that have not been updated. 
Conclusions. A method is proposed for the securing of web pharmacy sites, using a multi-
phased approach of technical and managerial techniques together with a thorough 
understanding of national legal requirements for securing systems. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
A number of factors have contributed to the increase in online healthcare systems, including 
web-based pharmacies. The cost savings and ease of use of these sites have created a way for 
consumers to gain knowledge about their health concerns as well as efficiently purchase less-
costly products compared to some traditional pharmacies. Even though an increasing number 
of consumers are using these sites, these consumers may be under the assumption that the 
private data they provide to these firms is secure, and that these online firms take care with 
providing them with a secure purchasing environment. They may also assume that any 
national data or security protection law extends to all international sites. Although some 
countries have enacted laws to protect consumer data and mandate secure sites, consumers 
should realize that legal protection of their data is not comprehensive among all sites due to 
the myriad of laws (or lack of) across countries and local entities [1]. 
Internet web applications are highly susceptible to various types of attacks, and more 
attacks occur every year with unprotected sites [2]. Some of the most common vulnerabilities 
reported by industry groups include cross-site scripting, injection and buffer overflow flaws 
[2,3,4]. Several studies of web vulnerabilities have previously been done, and will be 
discussed in section 2.3 of this paper. However, these studies concentrated only on some 
aspects of web vulnerabilities, such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption, e-mail 
security and scripting. This research study expands the literature by reviewing a more robust 
list of vulnerabilities including cross-site scripting, infrastructure vulnerabilities, backup 
issues and web signature attacks. This study analyzes 60 online pharmacies to determine 
which types of vulnerabilities were the most common and the level of security protection that 
consumers can expect from this industry.  
 2. Framework for Web Security 
 
2.1 Consumer Viewpoint 
 
The growth of online pharmaceutical sales has been growing at an outstanding pace for the 
past 10 years. According to Claburn [5], a study by MarkMonitor estimates that sales have 
risen from $4 billion in 2007 to $12 billion in 2008 and the average number of daily visitors 
at pharmacy sites has risen from 32,000 in 2007 to 99,000 in 2008. The number of potential 
consumers searching online pharmacy sites for lower-cost medicines has increased, with a 
34% increase in the web traffic for the number of people searching for online prescription 
drugs from first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009 [6]. 
The growth of this market is due to a variety of factors. First, the cost of the products is 
one overriding concern with consumers, especially those with no health insurance. According 
to the latest study by the U.S. Census Bureau [7], almost 46 million Americans (15.3% of the 
population) were not covered by health insurance in 2007. Due to the weak global economy, 
consumers are turning to cheaper alternatives, such as in the case of Americans turning to 
cheaper foreign pharmacies and spending over $1 billion annually with these firms [8].  
The quality of pharmaceutical purchases is another reason for the growth of this market. 
Cook [9] indicates that with greater exposure to online purchasing, consumers have 
supplanted the novelty of online purchasing with a desire for a better quality purchasing 
experience and products that are comparable to offline healthcare options. A reason for the 
growth of these sites is that costs of pharmaceuticals are lower compared to costs in 
traditional pharmacies. A study by Quon, Firszt & Eisenberg [10] found that ―Americans can 
save a mean of approximately 24% per
 
unit of drug if they purchase their medications from 
Canadian
 
Internet pharmacies instead of from major online U.S. drug chain
 pharmacies.‖ A 
more recent analysis by an industry research firm, PharmacyChecker.com [6], finds that 
brand name medications can often be purchased at a 70% savings in overseas online 
pharmacies compared to traditional American pharmacies.  
The U.S. General Accounting Office [11] and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
official Hubbard [12] emphasize that they recognize the potential benefits of online 
prescription drug purchasing for American consumers. Hubbard cites several factors that 
consumers find positive, especially those individuals who are disabled or ill. These benefits 
include ease of use, convenience, privacy for consumers who have problems they do not wish 
to discuss in person, and vastly expanded information access. 
 
2.2 Legal Aspects 
 
There is no comprehensive legal protection of online consumers with respect to security of 
their private information, and most protection would fall under the realm of computer 
security breaches or privacy laws.  Security safeguards are dependent upon a range of various 
international, national and local laws, and it is difficult for consumers to know the level of 
protection for a specific pharmacy, as well as the actual security measures the pharmacy site 
has implemented to secure the purchasing event. For example, a consumer living in 
California may submit an order from a well-designed web site that appears to originate from 
the U.S., but may be based in another country. Thus, if a security problem occurred, and their 
records were compromised, the consumer would not be afforded the same level of legal 
protection that they might have under U.S. or California law.  
In the U.S., the Administrative Simplification portion of the Health Information 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was designed to provide the 
development of a uniform, computer-based health information system and to address privacy 
and security of personal health-related data [13]. Although it may be assumed that all types of 
health care types of web sites, including online pharmacies, would be included in this 
legislation, this is not necessarily the case. According to Choy [13], HIPAA only applies to 
three types of entities: health care providers, health plans and health care clearing houses. 
Because it is often ambiguous which activities are covered under the guise of online 
pharmacies, it is difficult to ascertain whether a specific U.S.-based online pharmacy would 
fall under HIPAA legislation. Different rules may apply to different sites offering the same 
services, and thus consumers may or may not legally have privacy and security protection for 
a specific US-based online pharmacy. 
Due to deficiencies with HIPAA in covering all entities and the lack of consumer 
notification when computer security breaches occur, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
proposed a Data Breach Notification Rule in April 2009 [14]. Traditionally, the FTC has 
concentrated on protecting consumer privacy for traditional commerce, but the growth of new 
technologies and online health-related entities, such as online pharmacies, has led them to 
propose this new rule to strengthen privacy and also address security matters, such as data 
breaches. The Recovery Act expands the types of web-based entities that are not covered 
under HIPAA, and requires security and breach notification requirements when computer 
breaches have occurred [14]. However, this is merely a proposed rule, and is not yet in effect. 
Other countries may or may not have similar legislation that protects online consumers 
from security breaches and unsecure data. Under the U.K.‘s Data Protection Act of 1998, 
entities have the legal obligation to protect consumer‘s personal data and the Act governs 
responsibilities for those entities storing data. However, there are shortcomings with the law, 
and additional legislation was introduced in 2008 to include notification requirements for 
breaches and giving the Information Commissioner the power to conduct computer audits [1]. 
In Ireland, only businesses on a prescribed list are required to notify consumers of breaches, 
and in Sweden and Germany, they are not required to notify except under specific 
circumstances [1]. Some countries in the Asia Pacific region have weak protection. For 
example, in Japan there is a weak Personal Information Protection Act, while China has no 
data protection legislation [1].. Thus, with a myriad of different security and protection laws 
throughout the world, it is difficult for online consumers to establish what level of protection 
they have when purchasing from these sites.  
 
2.3 Security Problems and Breaches  
 
According to Mello [15], a study of 3,200 online pharmacies monitored by the researchers at 
MarkMonitor found serious problems with security in online pharmacies. The study found 
the following problems: 
 More than 50% of sites did not secure customer information 
 A majority of sites did not use SSL encryption 
 In more than 20% of post-purchase e-mails, unencrypted links to customer 
information were found 
Another assessment of over 1,000 Internet pharmacies found that 25% did not secure 
patient‘s information [16]. Similar security breaches have occurred in other online health-
related sites, such as a major breach of over 800 Kaiser Permanente (KP) members through
 
KP Online, a web-enabled health care portal. Two programmers had written poorly designed 
scripts which resulted in emails breaching the confidentiality and integrity of the members‘ 
personal health information A case study was completed on this breach, and the authors 
concluded that in order to protect sensitive patient information, safeguards should be built 
into online systems in addition to complying with good information
 
security practice and 
regulations suggested in HIPAA [17]. 
In 2004, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada received complaints about a 
specific online pharmacy alleging that consumers‘ personal information had been 
compromised and that the pharmacy had failed to implement computer security safeguards to 
protect personal sensitive information. After an investigation, the company admitted to a 
security breach and did institute appropriate safeguards to mitigate future security problems 
[18].   
 
2.4 Web Application Security 
 
With the growth of electronic commerce, web application security has become a significant 
concern of consumers whose data may be at risk from unsecured systems. A report by web 
security firm, Cenzic [2], indicates that for the second half of 2008, almost 80%  of all web-
related flaws are caused by web applications vulnerabilities, while plugins/ActiveX 
vulnerabilities are 12%, web browsers are 7% and web servers are 2%. The study further 
analyzed the major types of vulnerabilities by their particular class, and reported the most 
common flaws and the percentage of such vulnerabilities: 
 SQL Injection – 24% 
 Denial of Service – 18% 
 Cross-Site Scripting – 14% 
 Miscellaneous – 14% 
 Buffer Overflow – 11% 
 Directory Traversal – 7% 
Diverse security firms have reported slightly different results in their top vulnerabilities, 
although the most common flaws are included within all studies. For example, the Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP), a worldwide free and open community focused on 
improving application security, publishes a list of common application vulnerabilities, as well 
as tools and documentation on how to protect systems. For 2007, they list the top five 
vulnerabilities as  
 Cross-Site Scripting 
 Injection Flaws 
 Malicious File Execution 
 Insecure Direct Object Reference 
 Cross Site Request Forgery [3] 
Another worldwide security organization, the SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, 
Security) Institute, also lists cross-site scripting, structured query language (SQL) injection 
and cross site forgery as major web vulnerabilities for 2007 [4]. Thus although various 
organizations may list certain vulnerabilities in different ranking order, all agree that certain 
web application vulnerabilities are common across the industry, including scripting and 
injection flaws. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The research was accomplished through completing an analysis of 60 online pharmacy sites 
to determine the most prevalent security problems for these sites. The project consisted of 
four phases: 
1. Choosing an online testing tool 
2. Choosing a list of online pharmacy sites to test 
3. Running a software analysis 
4. Performing an in-depth analysis of the results 
 
3.1 Choosing a Testing Tool 
 
The first phase of the study was to choose a tool which could scan for web application 
security vulnerabilities for the chosen pharmacy sites. For this project, the researchers were 
looking for either a free demo version or an affordable version that would test a variety of 
problems, including scripting issues. In addition, the software had to be installed on a stand-
alone PC that would require minimal installation configuration or programming knowledge. 
A number of tools were evaluated including: International Business Machines (IBM) 
Rational AppScan, Nessus, Retina and Sara. However, there were a variety of reasons that 
these products were eliminated including: costs, difficulty in using the product and needing to 
install the product on a network instead of a personal computer (PC). It should be noted that 
the functionality and product availability for various platforms was reviewed during the 
research phase of this project. Between this time and subsequent publication, software 
versions and functions may have emerged, thus enabling different testing for future research. 
The first product that was reviewed was IBM‘s Rational AppScan (Version 7.9), which 
appeared very robust and could scan a wide variety of web application vulnerabilities 
including buffer overflows, cross-site scripting and SQL injection [19]. Although a free 
download version of the software was offered, this version was limited in only being able to 
test one pre-defined web site [20]. The second product reviewed was Nessus Vulnerability 
Scanner (version 4.2.2), from Tenable Network Security. This product had a variety of 
functions, including vulnerability scanning, auditing, data discovery and configuration 
auditing, most of which were not a fit for this research project [21].  
Retina software from eEye Digital Security (version 5.11.1) was also analyzed. From the 
documentation, this product was geared more towards network scanning for an enterprise, as 
opposed to third party vulnerability testing. The installation also required one gigabyte (GB) 
Ram, Microsoft .NET framework and Microsoft Windows 2000 Server [22], which negated 
installing on a stand-alone PC. The last piece of software reviewed and rejected was Security 
Auditor‘s Research Assistant (Sara) (version 7.9.1), from Advanced Research Corporation. 
This product could be installed on a standalone PC and checks for a variety of vulnerabilities 
like cross-site scripting and SQL injection tests, and was free to use [23]. However, after 
downloading the zipped installation file, it was difficult to progress further with the 
installation. The downloaded zipped file contained several hundred of installation files and 
there were no clear-cut directions for installation or use. Due to lack of time to research this 
product, its use was rejected.  
N-Stalker Web Application Security Scanner 2009 Free Edition (version 7.0) was 
reviewed and chosen. This is a free version of N-Stalker‘s Enterprise Scanner and is aimed 
towards individuals and small organizations who wish to perform a more limited 
vulnerability test than the full functionality contained in their Enterprise-wide scanning tool 
[24]. However, the level of functional testing for the Free Edition was robust enough for the 
purpose of this study, which is to test overall vulnerability of online pharmacy sites from a 
general perspective as opposed to an in-depth penetration testing that would be completed by 
a security consulting firm. The free version will check up to 100 pages within a target site, 
and contains the following tests: 
1. Cross-Site Script Injection 
2. Web Server Infrastructure including Web Server, Platform, secured sockets layer 
(SSL) encryption, HTTP Method discovery, Directory Brute-Force, hypertext 
transfer protocol (HTTP) protocol and other vulnerabilities 
3. Web Signature Attacks including Internet Information Services (IIS), FrontPage, 
common gateway interface (CGI) Security, hypertext preprocessor (PHP) Security, 
active server pages (ASP) Security, SANS Top 20 and other tests 
4. Backup security check [25] 
After a successful download and installation of this product on a PC, a usability review 
was done on using the software. It was relatively easy to choose and configure options for 
testing, and an easy-to-read report of vulnerabilities was produced. Figure 1 shows the 
resulting screen print of the initial test after installation. The column ‗Scanner Events‖ shows 
the specific vulnerabilities for this site in an easy-to-understand format. Therefore, because 
the level of functional testing, ease of installation, free cost and comprehensive testing report, 
N-Stalker was chosen for this study. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Screen print of N-Stalker testing report 
 
3.2 Choosing Testing Sites 
 
The second phase of this project was to choose a list of online pharmacies to test. An 
advanced Google search was used to find the top 60 results of online pharmacies using the 
following criteria: 
 Search within site domain = .com 
 Keywords = online pharmacy 
Although thousands of Google results were displayed, only the top commercial sites were 
chosen. When reviewing the results, each site was reviewed and only sites that sold products 
and had shopping carts were added to the list. Some of the sites in the top were purely 
informational sites, such as www.pharmacychecker.com, so these sites were discarded. Thus, 
60 functional e-commerce sites were compiled, and the complete list is shown in Appendix 
A. 
 
3.3 Running the Software Analysis 
 
For this study, the N-Stalker free edition software was downloaded from the vendor‘s web 
site, and then installed on a PC. For each online pharmacy, the Uniform Resource Locator 
(URL) for the pharmacy‘s home page was inserted into the Scan Wizard box and scans were 
run on the pharmacy site. The cross-site scripting, web signature attacks and web server 
infrastructure functions were chosen to test. Each specific test took between 0.5 and 3 hours 
to run, depending upon the size of the pharmacy site, number of pages and number of 
vulnerabilities found in the test results. The software then scanned the URL for a number of 
web application vulnerabilities. 
After the test was completed, a report was produced showing a list of web vulnerabilities. 
Each vulnerability was categorized into one of three levels:  
 High level – severe problems that had serious repercussions on web application 
security and could lead to a high risk of damage or potential of attacks. These issues 
should take precedence when setting a schedule for correction. 
 Medium – moderately ranked problems that could pose some level of risk to users 
of the web application. These should be corrected, but after high-level issues are 
fixed. 
 Informational – messages that probably posed little or no issue of risk to users, but 
still should be reviewed and addressed by web developers. 
This phase of the study was completed in June 2009, with the use of N-Stalker to 
determine the main types and quantities of vulnerabilities for each site. One issue was found 
when attempting to run the scan for the site http://www.online-pharmacy.cc/. N-Stalker 
produced an ‗Access Violation‘ problem and the scan was aborted. Therefore, another 
pharmacy was substituted. The raw data from the results was then compiled into tabular 
format and analyzed. 
 
4. Analysis of Results  
 
Table 1 shows a compiled report of vulnerability testing results of the 60 online pharmacies. 
The first column shows various statistical results, while the second, third and fourth columns 
various severity level results: the quantity of high, medium and informational priority levels 
for specific vulnerabilities. The first and second rows show the total numbers of 
vulnerabilities (351 high level, 7576 medium and 405 informational) for all 60 sites and the 
mean value of flaws per each site (5.85 high, 126.3 medium and 6.75 informational).  
There was a wide range of the number of total vulnerabilities for each site. High priority 
issues ranged from 0 to 73, medium level ranged from 0 to 2091 and informational messages 
ranged from 0 to 23 per site. Regarding the specific types of flaws, the high category ranged 
from 0 to 12, while medium priority ranged from 0 to 252, and informational ranged from 0 
to 3. An example for the prior two rows would mean that one type, such as ‗old mod ssl 
versions‘, could be found for that URL, thus counting as one occurrence in the ‗range of 
vulnerability types per site.‘ However, each pharmacy site could contain one or many 
occurrences of that specific vulnerability. So a site like http://www.speedyhealth.com/ might 
contain the high priority issue ‗old mod ssl versions‘, but could have 12 occurrences located 
on various pages throughout the site. 
In addition, the fifth row in Table 1 shows the number of sites that had no specific 
vulnerabilities for each of the three priority levels. Thirty sites did not contain any high 
priority flaws, while 12 sites did not have any medium priority vulnerabilities and only four 
sites contained no informational messages. The final row contains the totals for how many 
different types of vulnerabilities were found for all combined sites. In this study, there were 
31 high-priority and 481 medium priority errors types, and 3  different informational 
vulnerabilities.  
 
Table 1. Vulnerability Testing Results 
 
Vulnerability Issues High Medium Informational 
Number of 
vulnerabilities for all 60 
sites 
351 7576 405 
Mean number of flaws 
per site 
5.85 126.3 6.75 
Range of total number of 
vulnerabilities per site  
0 to 73 0 to 2091  0 to 23 
Range of types of flaws  
per site* 
0  to 12 0 to 252 0 to 3 
Number of sites with no 
vulnerabilities 
30 12 4 
Total number of different 
types of vulnerabilities 
for all 60 sites 
31 481 3 
*Refer to Table 2 for details on types 
 Results in Table 2 show the most common vulnerability types for each of the three 
severity levels: high, medium and informational. Although a large number of flaws (31 high 
and 481 medium) were compiled for each level, this table only shows the top 10 
vulnerabilities. For the informational issues, only three different types were exhibited in the 
scanning results. Column 2 of Table 2 differentiates the specific web vulnerability messages 
that were produced in the N-Stalker report. The last two columns show the total number of 
occurrences for that vulnerability, along with the number of sites that contained that 
vulnerability.  
 
Table 2. Most Common Problem Types 
 
 
Total 
Number 
of Errors  
Number 
of Sites 
per 
Error 
High  Level   
 SAP Internet Transaction Server COMMAND 
Cross-Site Scripting  
86 4 
 SAP Internet Transaction Server URLMME 
Cross-Site Scripting 
86 4 
 E-business Designer 3.1.4 Multiple Input 
Validation  
47 1 
 Mini-SQL w3-msql 2.0.11 Buffer Overflow 22 2 
 Old OpenSSL Version Might Be Susceptible  18 14 
 Old apache Version May Be Susceptible  17 17 
 Old Mod_ssl versions Might Be Susceptible  11 11 
 CGI-Club im TRBBS 1.0.2 Remote Command 
Execution  
9 1 
 Microsoft Windows 2000 Resource Kit 
W3Who.DLL  
9 11 
 MyServer 0.6.2 Multiple Remote 
Math_sum.mscgi Example Script Vulnerability 
9 1 
Medium Level 
 Apache 2.0 Encoded Backslash Directory 
Traversal  
277 1 
 Possible Cross-Site Scripting and/or HTML 
Injection  
262 11 
 WebMod 0.48 AUTH W Cross-Site Scripting  136 4 
 Aestiva HTML/OS 2.4 Cross-Site Scriptng  134 5 
 NetWin Dnews 57e1 Dnewsweb EXE Cross-Site 101 4 
Scripting  
 OmniHTTPD 2.4 Sample Scripting Cross-Site 
Scripting 
98 6 
 Lilikoi Software Celldh 2.70 Cross-Site Scripting  94 4 
 Lighthouse CMS 1.1 Search Cross-Site Scripting  93 5 
 Box UK Amaxus 3.0 Cross-Site Scripting  92 5 
 Sambar Server 6.1 beta2 Administrative Interface 
Multiple Cross-Site Scripting  
90 4 
Informational  
 Uncommon HTTP Methods Supported 385 53 
 Downloadable Object Found 16 4 
 Directory Allows for File Listing 12 3 
 
 
Among the high priority vulnerabilities, there were a sizable number in various categories 
within the top 10 results. The top 2 error types belonged to cross-site scripting issues, with 86 
total occurrences found in four different sites for each of these scripting flaws. Input 
validation (47 errors in one site) and buffer overflows (22 errors in two sites) were also 
numerous. Three other common types dealt with old versions of software, such as OpenSSL, 
Apache, and mod_ssl. 
Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities also showed up quite frequently in the medium priority 
category. Although the most common medium level flaw was an Apache Directory Traversal 
vulnerability (277 occurrences for one site), the other 9 most common errors were all related 
to cross-site scripting issues. 
The most common informational message was ‗Uncommon HTTP Methods supported,‘ 
which occurred 385 times in 53 sites. Other common messages were ‗Downloadable Object 
Found‘ (16 occurrences in four sites) and ‗Directory Allows for File Listing‘ (12 occurrences 
in three sites).  
 
5. Technical Implications 
 
Evaluation results showed that the majority of sites (80%) had either critical or medium-level  
vulnerabilities, which could pose grave problems to online consumers who use the sites. Old 
software version is a flaw common in the high priority vulnerability level. Although only 
three types of ‗old‘ software issues were listed in Table 2, there were three other 
vulnerabilities of this type that were actually included in the raw data: a) old .NET framework 
version (two occurrences), b) old version of mod_python (one occurrence) and c) old 
versions of Microsoft-IIS (19 occurrences). Thus, combining these numbers and the results of 
the three types found in Table 2, there were 68 occurrences of version-type problems, of 
which a site could possibly have several occurrences depending upon which type of software 
they have installed. In order to fix this vulnerability, N-Stalker [25] recommended that the 
software be upgraded to the latest version.  
One other problem that relates to older versions of software and not installing upgraded 
versions deals with the medium level vulnerability ‗Apache 2.0 Encoded Backslash Directory 
Traversal.‘  A vulnerability exists in the default installation of Apache, as well as versions 
earlier than 2.0.39. The exploitation could result in disclosure of sensitive information, and it 
is recommended that the site operator install an updated version of Apache [25]  
Although security experts recommend prompt upgrades of software upgrades and 
patches, this study clearly shows that this recommendation is not being implemented by many 
site operators. Cox [26] lists several reasons why developers may not perform timely 
upgrades including. 
1. Developers ―install and forget.‖ They install a default piece of software and forget 
that it needs to be kept up-to-date to maintain security. 
2. The users may not consider security flaws worth worrying about. With so many 
vulnerability released each day by attackers, developers may have difficulty trying to 
determine which upgrades and important and which are trivial. 
3. Developers may not perform the upgrade correctly. For example, they may properly 
upgrade a new version of OpenSSL, but then may forget that the Apache server also 
needs to be restarted in order to pick up shared libraries.  
One of the most common informational messages was ‗Uncommon HTTP Methods 
supported,‘ where N-Stalker determined that an insecure HTTP method was detected in the 
web server, which could lead to possible exploitation. Web developers can use several HTTP 
methods in their applications including: a) GET, b) HEAD, c) POST, d) PUT, e) DELETE, f) 
TRACE and g) CONNECT [27]. According to W3C [28] ―the GET and HEAD methods 
should not have the significance of taking an action other than retrieval. These methods ought 
to be considered "safe". This allows user agents to represent other methods, such as POST, 
PUT and DELETE, in a special way, so that the user is made aware of the fact that a possibly 
unsafe action is being requested.‖ Thus, if a web developer improperly uses a TRACE verb, 
N-Stalker [25] indicates that information leakage problems could occur, or this method could 
reveal internal private HTTP Headers. N-Stalker also cautions that a method such as 
DELETE may allow for arbitrary file uploading and should not be available under normal 
conditions. Thus, web developers should take care in using HTTP methods and use those 
considered ‗safe.‘  
Other common web application flaws that were also found in 2007 and 2008 industry 
reports included cross-site scripting, buffer overflow, injection and traversal flaws [1, 2, 3]. 
These types of problems, especially cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, were found 
prominently in this study. The SANS Institute [29] indicates that to protect against these 
flaws, developers should engage in strong coding practices and use input validation methods 
to validate data before storing or displaying it. Injection flaws can occur when attackers trick 
an interpreter into executing unintended commands. This vulnerability can be minimized by 
either avoiding interpreters in coding, or if requiring their use, then practicing safe coding 
practices such input validation and showing care when using stored procedures [30]. Buffer 
overflows are best minimized by keeping up with security patches to web application servers 
and proper input coding validation [31].  
 
6. Design and Business Implications 
 
Besides reviewing their web applications for specific web vulnerabilities such as cross site 
scripting problems, designers and site owners also need to take a broader approach to their 
overall security and realize that they should take a multi-phase approach to their security 
agenda. First, they must realize that effective web application security is a business factor in 
running a successful firm, not just a technical issue. Ko and Dorantes [32] performed a study 
to gauge the market reaction and change to financial performance after the announcement of 
security breaches. Their results show that breaches can have a negative impact on the short-
term financials of the firm, although they do not contribute to long-term economic impact. 
They suggest that immediately after the breach, companies enact stronger security measures 
to prevent future breaches, thus having a positive impact on the future of the firm. However, 
companies should understand that in the short term, they can suffer from negative publicity, 
financial problems and loss of time as employees struggle to contain the impacts of the 
breach. The financial setbacks to a firm can be sizable. A study by the Ponemon privacy and 
information management research institute reported that of 43 data breaches at large firms, it 
found that the average per-incident cost range to $6.65 million in 2008, with the cost per 
compromised customer estimated at $202. Most of the costs were attributed to business loss 
of angry customers abandoning the firm due to the loss or compromising of their personal 
data [33]. Thus, with the potential for actual financial loss and bad publicity among 
customers, firms should put security into the light of protecting their business assets.  
Setting aside enough funding for web application security should be of critical concern to 
firms. However, with the economic budget crisis, many firms are holding back on setting 
appropriate security budgets. Even though web application vulnerabilities comprise 80% of 
web attacks, firms are not increasing funds for web applications, even though they are still 
spending money on network security [2]. This is a shortsighted view and displays a lack of 
priority-setting for a significant portion of a firm‘s business. 
Within a multi-phased approach to securing web applications, pharmacy site owners and 
developers need to emphasize secure application development as a priority. Waters [34] 
indicates that it is ultimately the developers who are responsible for application security. 
However, instead of the firm emphasizing rapid development and finishing projects as soon 
as possible while spending the least amount of money, site owners and managers need to put 
just as high a priority on securing the systems. However, this often does not happen in many 
web application projects. Sergey Gordeychik, a contribution to the Web Application Security 
Consortium (WASC), indicates that most web applications are vulnerable and security 
requirements are often not considered in the system design, making them vulnerable to 
breaches [35]. 
Site owners should understand how the legal issues can affect their business. Online 
pharmacies should review applicable federal, state and local ordinances with regards to 
security and personal data safeguards. Many laws have already been passed, and others are 
pending, so it would be wise for pharmacies to coordinate with their legal advisors to 
properly assess and analyze applicable and upcoming legislation [36]. In addition, mandatory 
workshops or training for staff and developers should be held in order to update them on their 
legal obligations to providing secure systems and safeguarding consumer data. Staff should 
understand how to properly handle data, and application developers should be taught how 
improper security development could have an adverse affect on the school from a legal 
standpoint. 
Perceived lack of trust or ineffective security can have an adverse effect on consumer 
perception of online health portals and some site owners have implemented measures to 
increase this level of trust and provide consumers the opportunity to review security 
robustness of the site [37]. Luo & Najdawi [37] analyzed consumer health sites and suggested 
that site owners have self-regulating policies such as publishing their privacy and security 
policies directly on their site. Consumers could then check the sites security practices and 
procedures, and determine whether they wish to purchase from a pharmacy based on stated 
practices. Although this allows for consumers to gage some measure of a firm‘s security 
measures, self-regulating policies are not standardized and consumers may find a large 
difference in detail among sites [37]. 
Another method consumers can use to review security levels is to check if the site has 
a third-party seal or code of conduct. Third-party seals are licensing programs where sites can 
be accredited in a specific area by a third-party organization. There are five main categories 
of seals: a) reliability web site seals, b) security seals, c) vulnerability web site seals, d) 
privacy seals and e) consumer ratings seals [38]. To check for overall online security, 
consumers could check if a site has a seal from firms such as Verisign, Comodo, and 
GeoTrust validating that a site has SSL protection (or a ‗lock‘ image at the bottom of the 
browser window) [38]. Vulnerability Web site seals, such as HackerSafe and SquareTrade, 
signify that a third-party firm scans the site periodically for common security vulnerabilities 
[38]. One caveat for consumers is that is that it may be confusing on how the third-party seals 
are differentiated and which functions each provides. For example, the HONcode seal is often 
included on health-related sites and evaluates the reliability of health information on the sites, 
but does not review security vulnerabilities [39]. Also, consumers should understand that 
although a vulnerability seal may provide some level of security mitigation, new 
vulnerabilities do appear quickly and may not necessarily be caught in a monthly third-party 
scan.  
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
This research shows that a preponderance of worldwide online pharmacy sites do not provide 
adequate protection to their consumers. Almost all sites showed a range of vulnerability 
flaws, especially cross-site scripting and old versions of software that have not had security 
patches applied. The main types of issues displayed in these pharmacy sites correspond to the 
top vulnerabilities found by security industry groups. Although it is impossible to make an 
application 100% secure, site owners and developers can still utilize a multi-phased approach 
to minimizing vulnerabilities to their site. Besides implementing published technical updates 
and safe coding practices, developers and site owners should also become more educated on 
the business reasons and legal mandates that make a secure site advantageous from a business 
perspective. This multi-phased approach to security will provide a better level of consumer 
protect and ultimately lead to higher levels of consumer trust and profitability.    
 
Appendix A: List of Pharmacy Sites Tested 
Company URL 
Official Medicines http://officialpharmacy.com/ 
Discount Online Pharmacy http://westmeds.com/ 
Abconlinepharmacy.com http://www.abconlinepharmacy.com/ns/customer/home.php 
AffordableRx.com http://www.affordablerx.com/ 
Alismed http://www.alismed.com/ 
Allcures.com http://www.allcures.com/ 
Allpharmacy.com http://www.allpharmacy.com/ 
VitoPharma http://www.andrespharmacy.com/ 
Buy-pharmacy-online.com http://www.buy-pharmacy-online.com/ 
Canadadrugspharmacy.com http://www.canadadrugpharmacy.com/ 
CanadaDrugs.com http://www.canadadrugs.com/ 
CanadaDrugsOnline http://www.canadadrugsonline.com/ 
Canada Pharmacy http://www.canadapharmacy.com/ 
Canadianpharmacychoice.com http://www.canadianpharmacychoice.com/ 
Canadianpharmacymeds.com http://www.canadianpharmacymeds.com/ 
Canada Online Healthlink http://www.candrugstore.com/ 
Clockwork Pharmacy http://www.clockworkpharmacy.com/ 
Costapharmacy.com http://www.costapharmacy.com/ 
DirectChemist.com http://www.directchemist.com/ 
DoctorSolve Healthcare http://www.doctorsolve.com/ 
DrugsBoat Online Pharmacy http://www.drugsboat.com/ 
Drugs-Med.com http://www.drugs-med.com/ 
Drugstore.com http://www.drugstore.com/  
Drugstore Telemedicine http://www.drugstoretm.com/ 
Epharma2u.com http://www.epharma2u.com/ 
Euromedspharmacy.com http://www.euromedspharmacy.com/ 
Centralux ltd http://www.exactfindrx.com/ 
Freedom Pharmacy RX http://www.freedompharmacyrx.com/ 
European Pharmacie http://www.globalpharmacie.com/ 
RF Drugstore http://www.gonorthpharmacy.com/ 
Health Check Pharmacy http://www.healthcheckpharmacy.com/ 
Internationaldrugmart.com http://www.internationaldrugmart.com/ 
Labodiscount http://www.labodiscount.com/ 
Medicones2u.com http://www.medicines2u.com/ 
Medrx-One http://www.medrx-one.com/ 
Meds4u http://www.meds4u.com/ 
mexmeds4you.com http://www.mexmeds4you.com/home.asp 
Mrs Pharmacy http://www.mrspharmacy.com/ 
Multipharmacy.com  http://www.multipharmacy.com/ 
My Dispensary http://www.mydispensary.com/ 
Norton Clinic http://www.nortonclinic.com/ 
Onlinepharmaciescanada.com http://www.onlinepharmaciescanada.com/ 
Online-pharmacy.cc http://www.online-pharmacy.cc 
Online Pharmacy Meds http://www.onlinepharmacymeds.com/ 
Orderpharma.com http://www.orderpharma.com/ 
PharmacyRxWorld.com http://www.pharmacyrxworld.com/ 
Pillsforall http://www.pillsforall.com/ 
Planetdrugsdirect.com http://www.planetdrugsdirect.com/ 
Reach Pharmacy http://www.reachpharmacy.com/ 
Rxeruope.com http://www.rxeurope.com/ 
Rxfastfind.com http://www.rxfastfind.com/ 
Rxmedscanada.com http://www.rxmedscanada.com/ 
Speedyhealth.com http://www.speedyhealth.com/ 
Squaremeds.com http://www.squaremeds.com/ 
TabMD.com http://www.tabmd.com/ 
Tl-pharmacy http://www.tl-pharmacy.com/ 
Travelpharm.com http://www.travelpharm.com/ 
Ukmedix http://www.ukmedix.com/ 
Universal Drugstore http://www.universaldrugstore.com/ 
WorldRxStore.com http://www.worldrxstore.com/ 
 
Appendix B: List of Abbreviations 
ASP Active Server Pages 
CGI Common Gateway Interface 
FDA Food and Drug Administration 
FTC Federal Trade Commission 
GB Giga byte 
HIPPA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
IBM International Business Machines 
IIS Internet Information Services 
KP Kaiser Permanente 
OWASP Open Web Application Security Project 
PC Personal Computer 
PHP Hypertext preprocessor 
SANS SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security 
Sara Security Auditor‘s Research Assistant 
SQL Structure Query Language 
SSL Secured Sockets Layer 
WASC Web Application Security Consortium 
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